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A B S T R A C T
To address the problem of information asymmetry in renewable electricity markets, European governments have
introduced certification schemes. While certification appears to be an increasingly important trade mechanism
for renewable electricity, it is unclear to what extent certificate markets are functioning properly. In addition,
countries have chosen very different designs for their certification schemes. In order to assess the performance of
markets for Guarantee of Origin certificates in twenty European countries, we construct four market perfor-
mance indicators and analyse their development over 2001–2016: the churn rate, price volatility, the certifi-
cation rate and the expiration rate. We also investigate the relationship between market performance and two
design features of certification schemes: the public/private nature of the certifier and the presence of an in-
ternational standard. We find that, despite increasing shares of renewable electricity are being certified, certi-
ficate markets suffer from poor liquidity and very volatile prices. In addition, we conclude that adopting an
international standard fosters the development of certificate systems.
1. Introduction
The emission of greenhouse gases by humans is associated with
significant economic and social damages (e.g. IPCC, 2014; Nordhaus,
2006). Many governments around the world are therefore attempting to
reduce their economy's greenhouse gas emissions. One of the typical
aims of these governments is to facilitate the change from a non-re-
newable to a renewable-based energy system. For example, the EU aims
to produce 27% of total energy consumption in 2030 from renewable
sources, coming from 17% in 2016 (European Commission, 2017). In
addition to traditional policy tools such as taxes and subsidies, gov-
ernments have implemented certification schemes to promote the use of
renewable energy.
Certificates have been introduced to address the problem of in-
formation asymmetry in energy markets. Information asymmetry is
typically present in energy markets because consumers cannot credibly
distinguish between renewable and non-renewable energy. As a con-
sequence, adverse selection may arise: consumers with a preference for
renewables may end up buying less or none at all (Akerlof, 1970). In-
formation asymmetry arises in energy markets because consumers do
not experience differences between consuming renewable and non-re-
newable energy and production tends to occur elsewhere. The presence
of networks in some important energy markets (e.g. electricity and gas)
further complicates distinguishing between renewables and non-
renewables because all energy in the network mingles. The purpose of
certification is to bridge this informational gap. By providing consumers
with information about unobservable characteristics (e.g. the produc-
tion method), they are enabled to make better decisions.
In Europe, several certificate systems have been introduced for en-
ergy goods. EU directives 2009/28/EC (EU, 2009) and 2001/77/EC
(EU, 2001) require member states to implement certificate systems for
renewable electricity, called Guarantees of Origin (GO). GO certificates
appear to be quite successful with approximately 35% of renewable
electricity production receiving certification in 2015 in the EU28
countries (plus Switzerland and Norway) (AIB, 2017). The directives
lay out a common framework for the design of GO certificate systems
but differences between countries remain in the adopted designs. For
example, differences exist in whether the certifier is a public or private
organization. At the same time, unlike in Europe, certification of re-
newable electricity in the United States is not organised by the gov-
ernment at all but completely entrusted to private organizations.
The main question we address in this paper is twofold: (i) how do
European markets for energy certificates perform, and (ii) how do de-
sign features of certificate systems relate to the performance of certi-
ficate markets. More specific, does it matter for the performance of a
certificate market if the certifier is a public or private institution and if
the certificate adheres to a common international standard. This paper
contributes to the literature by providing an empirical assessment of the
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performance of certificates for energy goods in government-created
markets. While other papers have generally focussed on a single
country (e.g. Roe et al., 2001; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011), we analyse
GO certificate markets in twenty European countries, which are com-
parable but differ in some critical design aspects, such as the public/
private nature of the certifier.
This paper analyses the performance of GO certificate markets and
the relationship between two design characteristics of certificate sys-
tems and market performance in twenty European countries over
2001–2016. We apply our analysis to the market for GOs because,
unlike certificate markets for other energy carriers, relatively detailed
data is available regarding quantities, prices and trade. Moreover, the
electricity GO system is the largest and most ambitious certification
scheme for energy goods in Europe. To investigate market performance,
we analyse four market indicators: the churn rate, price volatility, the
share of renewable electricity which is certified and the share of cer-
tificates that expires (i.e. is never used to claim consumption). We apply
a panel data regression to a reduced-form supply and demand model to
investigate the relationship between market performance and the
public/private nature and presence of an international certificate
standard.
Our results confirm that increasing amounts of renewable electricity
receive certification. However, GO markets suffer from very poor li-
quidity, as measured by the churn rate and volatile prices. While the
churn rate is slowly improving in the EU and most individual countries,
we do not observe improvements in volatility over time. Furthermore,
GO certificate markets have been in a relatively stable state of over-
supply. Overall, certification has become increasingly important as a
trade mechanism for renewable electricity but the performance of
certificate markets remains poor. With respect to the design char-
acteristics, we find that the presence of an international standard sig-
nificantly contributes to the market volume while we also find some
evidence for a positive effect of public ownership over the certifier on
market volumes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of the literature. Section 3 discusses the methods.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides the results. Finally,
Section 6 discusses the conclusions and policy recommendations.
2. Literature
2.1. Information asymmetry and certificates
Several theoretical papers discuss how providing information on the
basis of certificates reduce information asymmetry. In a seminal paper,
Akerlof (1970) describes how information asymmetry can result in
adverse selection: consumers may have a willingness-to-pay for a good
with certain quality aspects (e.g. renewable electricity) but if these
quality aspects are unobserved, consumers will not express their (full)
willingness-to-pay in the market. Certification aims to provide con-
sumers with information about these unobserved aspects such that
consumers can confidently express their willingness-to-pay in the
market. Applied to environmental goods, Dosi and Moretto (2001) and
Mattoo and Singh (1994) developed theoretical models that predict a
positive effect of certification on the supply of an environmental-
friendly type.
With respect to the design of certificate systems, several papers
question the reliability of the certifier. Mahenc (2017) and Feddersen
and Gilligan (2001) discuss how the incentive of certifiers is related to
providing honest information. In particular, when a certifier's goal de-
viates from maximizing social welfare, such as maximizing profit
(Mahenc) or maximizing environmental quality (Feddersen and Gil-
ligan), the certifier has an incentive to provide dishonest information.
When certifiers are profit-maximizing firms, Lizzeri (1999) shows that
competition between certifiers can results in honest certification.
There exists a broad literature that assesses the valuation of
unobservable attributes of energy goods by consumers. A first group of
these studies applies stated-preference methods to assess preferences
for different energy goods and their (unobservable) attributes in a hy-
pothetical buying situation. Particularly for the electricity market, there
is substantial evidence that consumers prefer renewable over non-re-
newable electricity (see Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015 for a meta-analysis).
A second group of studies applies revealed-preference methods to
investigate the willingness-to-pay for certified goods. For example,
using hedonic-pricing techniques, Roe et al. (2001) show that the pre-
mium for renewable electricity in the US significantly increases with
Green-E certification. More examples of revealed-preference analyses
showing that consumers value environmental certification include
Fuerst and McAllister (2011) for the US real-estate market and Elofsson
et al. (2016) for the Swedish milk market. However, there exists also
empirical evidence of environmental certification schemes that leave
consumer demand unaffected. Park (2017) finds that the presence of a
Korean energy-efficiency certificate does not influence the price of the
certified goods. Similarly, Hornibrook et al. (2015) report that an
ecolabel of the largest supermarket in the UK containing carbon in-
formation does not affect consumer choices.
Another related branch of literature discusses the physical design of
certificates and the effect on consumer choice. Newell and Siikamaki
(2014) find that, in addition to factual information in energy-efficiency
certificates, the presence of logos (e.g. the US Energy Star or EU letter
grade logo) significantly increases the willingness-to-pay of consumers
for energy intensive household appliances.
2.2. European GO certificates
Several scientific papers specifically analyse the GO system. In a
qualitative study, Aasen et al. (2010) conduct interviews amongst
Norwegian firms to assess their perception of the informational content
of GOs and find that companies have a large degree of distrust in GOs
and do not believe that GOs result in any environmental effect. They
propose as explanations that Norwegians perceive their electricity
system as completely renewable because practically all domestic gen-
eration is renewable and that buying GOs does not affect the generation
mix. In line with this, Winther and Ericson (2013), using a field ex-
periment, found that a large group of Norwegian electricity consumers
virtually did not respond to an offer from their supplier to buy GOs.
From subsequent focus group sessions, the authors conclude that the
Norwegians predominantly rejected the offer because they perceived
their electricity as already being green. In a study on a European level,
Lise et al. (2007) discuss the key elements related to operating GO
systems in Europe and conclude that the functioning of GOs depends on
the presence of other support schemes (e.g. feed-in tariffs) as well as
electricity market fundamentals such as the level of competition and
level of domestic and international trade. In addition, the authors
suggest that trading GOs separately from associated electricity flows is
preferred over linked trading as the former minimizes the impact on the
existing electricity market while also being accurate and inexpensive. In
a study on the Dutch retail electricity market, Mulder and Zomer (2016)
conclude that GOs are not very effective as a policy instrument to foster
investments in renewable electricity generation. The GO system has
also been discussed as potential international tradable green certificate
system for compliance with (national) renewable energy targets. Spe-
cifically, Ragwitz et al. (2009) find that government-based trading in
GOs is preferred over company-based trading for the purpose of target
compliance because, amongst other advantages, the former is more
compatible with existing support schemes. In addition, Nilsson et al.
(2009) investigate the political and legislative processes over time
surrounding the proposition and rejection of GOs as instrument for
target compliance. They find that opponents of GO trading for target
compliance had stronger incentives, better coordination and a clearer
position and message than proponents.
European GO markets emerged in 2001 following EU legislation
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which mandates each member state to set up a certification scheme for
renewable electricity. The rest of this section outlines the appropriate
aspects of the GO system for our paper and draws heavily on the re-
levant legal documentation, in particular the EU directives 2009/28/EC
(EU, 2009) and 2001/77/EC (EU, 2001). European GOs (inter-
changeably used with certificates from here on) explicitly target redu-
cing information asymmetry between producers and consumers of re-
newable electricity. GO certificates are valid for one year and expire if
they are not consumed (referred to as cancelled) within this period.
While running a certification scheme is mandatory, countries have
considerable freedom in choosing their own certificate system design.
This has led to differences between countries with respect to quality
assurance and market organization.
Each country is required to appoint a certifier which is responsible
for issuing and cancelling certificates and facilitating trade. More than
one certifier may be appointed but each certifier is responsible for a
non-overlapping geographical area. As a result, only one monopolistic
certifier is active in most countries, except for Greece and Belgium
where multiple regional monopolists are active.
Countries may freely decide to appoint a public or private certifier.
France, Czech Republic and Portugal are the only countries with a
currently or previously active private certifier.
A number of countries have adopted a common international stan-
dard for their GO certificates. This EECS-standard standardizes the in-
formation provided in the certificate and rules regarding issuance,
cancellation and trade. EECS certificates are traded through a central
electronic hub which is operated by the Association of Issuing Bodies
(AIB), an association representing the GO certifiers. The presence of a
standard facilitates international trade through regular advantages of
standardization: it establishes a quality level of certificates and eases
comparison of certificates from different origins. The presence of a
central trading hub reduces transaction costs further because, absent a
central hub, each country may set their own import and export proce-
dures.
With respect to market organization, the EU rules try to foster an
integrated European market for certificates. Countries are obliged to
accept the import of GO certificates from other countries.1 However,
countries are free to set export restriction, which is done in practice by
two countries: Austria does not allow the export of certificates obtained
by a generator that has received state support and Spain requires any
revenue from exporting certificates to be transferred to the government,
which functions as an export ban.
Several countries exclude producers from obtaining certificates at
all when they received state support. This concerns Croatia, France,
Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg. The typical rationale for this policy
is that, as the state support intends to provide a regular profit for the
producers, additional revenues from certification would be windfall
profits.
Table 1 summarizes the design choices of the countries we analyse.
In addition to the presence of the international standard and the cer-
tifier's public/private character, this table reports if a country has ex-
port or certification restrictions in place.
3. Method
We assess the performance of certificate markets by constructing
four markets indicators (Section 3.1): the share of renewable electricity
with a certificate (the certification rate), the churn rate, price volatility
and the share of certificates that expires (the expiration rate). We relate
design features of certification schemes to market performance by es-
timating a reduced-form supply and demand model based on quantities
and market fundamentals (Section 3.2).
3.1. Market performance
Our four performance indicators relate to primary market outcomes,
such as quantities, prices and trade. Firstly, we assess the certification
rate, a measure of output. Generally, maturing markets are associated
with increasing output volumes. As the amount of certification is re-
lated to the amount of renewable electricity (which has recently been
increasing in many countries) we analyse the share of certified re-
newable electricity instead of the absolute volume. The certification





where Q refers to the volume of issued certificates, RE to the output of
renewable electricity (both in MWh) and t and i to time and country.
Secondly, we assess market liquidity by evaluating the churn rate.
The churn rate is frequently used as an indicator for liquidity in phy-
sical and financial markets (e.g. Heather, 2015; ACER/CEER, 2017). It
indicates how often a product is traded before it is consumed. The
churn rate may be defined as the ratio of traded volume to final con-
sumption. A higher churn rate indicates a higher level of market li-
quidity. For commodity markets, a threshold above which a market is
generally considered mature is 10 (Ofgem, 2009).
We construct three different churn rates in order to cope with the
unavailability of individual transaction data. Our dataset includes ag-
gregated data for the number of issued, cancelled, domestically traded,
imported and exported certificates per calendar year.2 As certificates
Table 1











Austria 2004 Public Yes No
Belgium 2006 Public No No
Cyprus 2014 Public No No
Croatia 2014 Public No Yes




Denmark 2004 Public No No
Estonia 2010 Public No No





Germany 2013 Public No Yes
Iceland 2011 Public No No
Ireland 2015 Public No Yes
Italy 2013 Public No No
Luxembourg 2009 Public No Yes
Netherlands 2004 Public No No
Norway 2006 Public No No
Portugal Not implemented Private
(2013–2015)
No No
Spain 2016 Public Yes No
Sweden 2006 Public No No
Switzerland 2009 Public No No
1 Expected fraud or ‘system weakness’ is a valid reason to deny imports of
certificates from a country.
2 The AIB provides certification data twice: (i) by the time of production and
(ii) by the time of transaction. Data provided by the time of production (i) refers
to when the electricity related to the certificate was produced while (ii) refers to
when the certificate transaction took place, e.g. the year a certificate was is-
sued. Discrepancies arise due to the administrative processing time of certifiers.
As a result, renewable electricity produced in year t may receive a certificate in
year t+ 1. Availability of data differs between the two statistics. E.g. data for
issuance and expiration of certificates by time of transaction does not exist prior
to 2009 while it is available for all years by time of production.
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expire after one year, certificates issued in a given calendar year may
have been cancelled in the same or next calendar year. The same goes
for imports. Imports in one year may have been cancelled in the same or
next calendar year. Similarly, transactions and cancellations in one year
can relate to certificates issued in the previous or same year. To over-
come this difficulty, we constructed three churn rates that differ in the
approach to calculate final demand for consumption.
The first churn rate (x1) is based on the domestically traded volume
and the number of issued and imported certificates in the same calendar
year. The number of issued and imported certificates jointly determine
the tradable volume in a market. For individual countries, the first
churn rate is given by:
= +x TQ IM ,ti titi ti1 (2)
where T is domestic transfers and IM imported certificates.
The second churn rate (x2) is based on current year's traded volume
and the number of issued and imported certificates in the previous year:
= +x TQ IM .ti tit i t i2 1, 1, (3)
The third churn rate is based on the current year's traded volume







The first churn rate relates current trade to current production, the
second relates current trade to previous production and the third relates
current trade to current consumption. There appears to be no good
reason to prefer one over the others with our dataset. Therefore, for
individual countries, we will report on the basis of the simple average of
these three churn rates (xr ):
= + +xr x x x
3
.ti ti ti ti
1 2 3
(5)
For the whole region (the international GO market), we cannot use
(2), (3) and (4) to calculate the churn rate because, for all countries
combined, imports/exports are equal to zero since all registered imports
and exports are between countries within the GO scheme. Therefore,
when considering the whole region, imports/exports should be re-
garded as transactions. The available volume for final consumption is
simply aggregated issued or cancelled volume. To take this into ac-
count, we calculate slight variations on (2), (3) and (4) for the whole
region (indicated by the prime superscripts):































where n refers to country. We report again on the basis of the simple
average:
= + +xr x x x
3
.t i i i
1 2 3
(5′)
We cannot compare this churn rate to the churn rate of individual
countries because (5′) will always tend to be higher than (5). This is
inherent to increasing the geographical span of the market such that
imports/exports become part of traded volume instead of the available
volume for consumption (increasing the churn rate's numerator and
decreasing the denominator). To calculate a churn rate for the whole
region which is comparable to the churn rate for individual countries,










Thirdly, we assess the development in certificate price volatility.
Price volatility is an indicator for fluctuations in the price, i.e. price
uncertainty. Generally, improvements in market maturity and liquidity
are associated with decreasing price volatility (ACM, 2014). In mature,
liquid markets, single events that affect supply or demand (e.g. a power
plant outage) are absorbed by the market with less profound price ef-
fects as compared to illiquid markets. A common measure of price vo-
latility is the standard deviation of price changes (e.g. Regnier, 2007).
Here, we calculate annual price volatility as the standard deviation of
monthly relative price changes.
Fourthly, we assess the expiration rate. If certificates are not used
within one year, they expire and are not used to prove the consumption
of renewable electricity. A high expiration rate is an indicator for low
demand from end-users for renewable electricity on the basis of a cer-
tificate. We calculate the expiration rate (er) by dividing the volume of





Larger values for this indicator are associated with increasing levels of
excess supply.
3.2. Relating certificate system design features to market performance
To relate the two design features to market performance, we esti-
mate a reduced-form supply and demand model of the quantity of is-
sued certificates on the wholesale market. The intuition behind the
model is that changes in the certified volume are caused by changes in
fundamental demand and supply factors. The quantities we observe
reflect equilibrium prices, i.e. points where the demand and supply
curves intersect. We are not able to isolate the effect of the design
features on supply or demand, but we are able to test whether they have
an effect on the market outcome, which is our main interest. We esti-
mate the model = X Y ZQ ( , , )ti ti ti ti where X contains the design char-
acteristics and Y and Z the fundamental supply and demand variables.
We will now first elaborate on these characteristics and fundamentals
(Section 3.2.1) and then discuss our empirical model (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1. Design characteristics and market fundamentals
The presence of an international standard, as opposed to a domestic
standard, facilitates international trade through reducing transaction
costs (e.g. Blind and Jungmittag, 2005; Swann et al., 1996). As a result
of more international trade, consumers have a greater number of pro-
ducts to choose from (which is particularly relevant if consumers care
about the production location) and competition between producers
increases. Overall, while some countries may experience increases and
others decreases, because of standardization, the quantity traded in the
market increases.
The public/private nature of a certifier can be related to market
performance through the reliability of certification and the certification
fee. Assuming that governments are more inclined to maximize social
welfare than firms, private certifiers have a greater incentive to provide
dishonest certification than public certifiers by certifying grey elec-
tricity as green, thereby increasing revenues (Mahenc, 2017). This puts
upward pressure on the supply of certificates. However, as Mahenc
points out, consumers may reasonably expect this type of behaviour
from a profit-maximizing certifier. As a result, consumers may trust a
private certifier less, putting downward pressure on demand. Also when
certification is honest, monopolistic profit-maximizing certifiers may
affect market outcomes by exercising market power and selecting a
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higher certification fee when left unregulated.
An important factor affecting the demand for certification is the
output of renewable electricity, which in turn largely depends on me-
teorological factors. The output of these generators is typically eligible
for certification such that increases in renewable electricity production
directly increase the potential certified volume (EU, 2009). The in-
stalled capacity of renewable electricity generators determines the
maximum output of renewable electricity. Meteorological conditions
such as the wind speed, rainfall and solar radiation determine the actual
output at a given moment.
Restriction policies on certification and exports affect the demand
for certificates on a wholesale level. Governments that limit certifica-
tion to non-supported generators put downward pressure on the de-
mand since certification becomes uninteresting to generators when
subsidies exceed certificate prices. Export restrictions limit the possi-
bilities to market the certificate for a generator, putting downward
pressure on expected benefits from certification and therefore demand
for certificates.
The price of electricity is expected to be relevant for the certified
volume through the demand for certificates. The final price of (certi-
fied) renewable electricity depends on both the certificate price and the
electricity wholesale price (BEUC, 2016; Mulder and Zomer, 2016). The
certificate price represents the green premium for renewable electricity
as certificates and physical electricity are traded separately. Retailers of
renewable electricity need to procure both physical electricity and a
certificate. Therefore, increases in the price of electricity raise the final
costs of renewable electricity for end-users, putting downward pressure
on the demand for renewable electricity and certificates.
Another important demand side variable is the level of income. As
income rises, both residential and industrial end-users increase their
demand for (renewable) electricity (Kamerschen and Porter, 2004).
Increases in the use of renewable electricity put upward pressure on the
demand for certificates as more certificates are required for end-users
with certificate-based renewable electricity contracts.
The supply curve on the certificate wholesale market is somewhat
peculiar. The marginal cost of certification by certifiers is nearly zero as
it is largely an automatized process and has no variable inputs besides
digital storage space. In a competitive market, the (short-run) supply
curve would therefore be a flat line at a price of zero. However, by EU
rules, GO certifiers are national/regional monopolists giving these firms
market power. As these firms tend to be regulated companies, the ex-
tent to which market power can be exerted depends on the regulatory
framework. In contrast to private certifiers, public certifiers have few
incentives to exert market power. But other forms of regulation than
public ownership can limit the exertion of market power as well, such
as appointment by tendering. Apart from the public/private nature of
certifiers, we have no information about the type of regulation in in-
dividual countries.
3.2.2. Empirical model
We estimate a panel data model of the quantity of issued certificates
Q in year t and country i, as a function of supply and demand funda-
mentals and the two design characteristics. The design characteristics
are represented by two dummy variables indicating whether the in-
ternational standard is present (ST , equal to 1 if present) and the cer-
tifier is public or private (priv, equal to 1 if private). The demand and
supply fundamentals we control for are total renewable electricity
generation (QRE), the consumer electricity price (PE) and a real GDP
index (Y ). Finally, we include two certification-policy dummy vari-
ables: export restrictions (exr ; equal to 1 if present) and certification
restrictions (cer ; equal to 1 if present). The equation we estimate is:= + + + + + + + + +Q ST priv QRE Y PE exr cer c u ,ti ti ti ti ti ti ti ti t ti1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(8)
where c is an unobserved, time-invariant individual effect. Here, this
may capture differences between countries in preferences for renewable
electricity (Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015). The (endogenously determined)
certification cost (i.e. the price in the wholesale market) is not included
in the empirical model as information for individual countries is largely
unavailable.
We also estimate an alternative specification based on Eq. (8) where
we consider a potential effect of the 2009 EU renewable energy direc-
tive on certificate market volumes. As this directive mandates countries
to make individual plans to foster renewable energy, we add to the
model a set of country-period dummies D that are equal to 1 in country
i after the reform (2009–2015) and zero otherwise. This captures, for
example, differences in renewable energy policy situations before and
after the reform within countries, taking into account that countries
may have reacted differently and consequently experienced different
developments. Because of the dummy structure, these variables may
also capture other non-included factors that vary between the two
periods, such as an increase in the willingness-to-pay for renewable
electricity in a country. The second model we estimate is:




GO markets are not very transparent. While quantity data is publicly
available through the AIB, price data is not publicly available, partly
because trade in GOs occurs only bilaterally or via brokers. Market
players appear to corroborate this lack of transparency in GO markets
(Greenfact, 2018). Nevertheless, we were able to obtain a comprehen-
sive dataset to analyse the functioning of GO markets.
We obtain data from various sources for 20 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. We
include this set of countries as they have implemented the EU GO
regulations while certification data is available for them in the AIB
database.3 Certification data is available from 2001 to 2016 while
availability for other variables is sometimes limited.
GO certification data comes from the AIB and includes annual data
on issuance, cancellation, expiration, domestic trade, imports and ex-
ports. The publicly available dataset aggregates certification data for all
types of electricity, including fossil and nuclear. For our analysis, the
AIB has provided separated data for fossil, nuclear and renewable
certificates. We almost exclusively use data for renewable electricity in
this paper. We encountered several shortcomings in the certification
data: (i) illogical reporting: Croatia cancelled and expired certificates
for the first time in 2014 while the first certificates were issued and
imported in 2015 and (ii) incomplete reporting: Sweden and Austria
issue non-tradeable type of GOs and these are not included in the AIB
database. Moreover, the database includes some entries which do not
relate to GO certificates. The database reports one non-zero entry for
the UK. Consultation with the AIB learned that this entry concerns RECS
certificates instead of GOs. RECS is a voluntary certification scheme
which used to be administered by the AIB.
We made three initial adaptations to the AIB database. First, we
remove Slovenia from the database because data is not reported out of
fears of exposing the trading position of a market participant. Second,
we remove the UK from the database since the reported activity con-
cerns RECS certificates instead of GOs. Third, we aggregate the data of
the four Belgian certifiers to obtain a single observation for Belgium.
Our GO price data comes from Greenfact. Greenfact is a market-
monitoring firm which obtains prices by consulting market participants.
3 Non-EU member states Norway and Switzerland have also implemented the
EU GO legislation.
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Our dataset includes monthly volume-weighted average prices for
certificates. It further specifies the production year, certificate origin
(country/region, e.g. Nordic), production technology and trade volume.
Observations range from 2011 to 2017 but periods are substantially
shorter for most of the products. In order to determine which prices are
comparable, we first distinguish between spot and forward contracts. A
spot contract is defined as contract with a production year equal to or
one year prior to the contract's transaction year. This seems logical
considering that certificates expire after one year. Most of the trades in
the database are spot contracts. We further distinguish products by
country/region of origin and production technology.
From Eurostat, we extract the real annual GDP index and the elec-
tricity price for all countries, except for Switzerland, which is not re-
ported. We use the bi-annual household electricity price and take the
simple average to estimate the annual average electricity price. Some
years are missing for Croatia, Estonia and Iceland. For Switzerland, we
use the average annual end-user price, as reported by the Swiss Federal
Office of Energy until 2015. All prices expressed in Swiss Francs are
converted into Euros using the annual average exchange rate according
to Eurostat.
We obtain annual data on the production of renewable electricity
for EU-countries and Norway from Eurostat (available until 2015). For
Switzerland, we obtain this data from the IEA.
Information about implementation of the international standard is
taken from Fact Sheet 17 on the AIB website. We inspect the websites of
the (former) national certifiers to determine whether they are public or
private institutions.
Table A.1 in appendix A reports all descriptive statistics, except for
certificate prices, which are reported in Table A.2.
5. Results and discussion
This section first discusses the results of the four market perfor-
mance indicators (Sections 5.1–5.4) and consequently the results of our
analysis of the relationship between the design features and market
performance (Section 5.5).
5.1. Certification rate
GO certification of renewable electricity has become increasingly
important in the EU since the start of operation in 2001. Fig. 1 shows
the development of the certification rate of renewable electricity, fossil
electricity and total electricity in all countries combined. The certifi-
cation rate of renewable electricity increased from 0.2% to 35.5% from
2001 to 2015. Certification of fossil electricity is much less important,
as indicated by the low certification rate of 1.7% in 2015.
There are significant differences between countries in the relative
importance of certification. Fig. 2 shows the development of the certi-
fication rate in individual countries by comparing the average certifi-
cation rate between four periods: 2001–2004 with 2005–2008 (panel
Fig. 1. The electricity certification rate in Europe, 2001–2015.
Sources: AIB, Eurostat, IEA.
Fig. 2. The certification rate per country, 2001–2015. Note: Each plot compares
the 4-year average with the preceding 4-year average from 2001 to 2015 (one
3-year period: 2012–2015).
Source: own calculations, AIB, Eurostat, IEA.
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a), 2005–2008 with 2009–2012 (panel b) and 2009–2012 with
2013–2015 (panel c). Years without an active certifier are excluded
when calculating averages. Country names are represented by two-
letter abbreviations. In these planes, countries on the diagonal lines
reflect equal observations for the two considered periods, hence no
change in the relative amount of certification.
In most countries, the amount of certified renewable electricity ei-
ther increases or remains stagnant between two periods. In all periods,
several countries are located above and quite distant from the diagonal
line, indicating a considerable increase in the certification rate.
Certification has become particularly important (> 70%) in Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. Most other coun-
tries have experienced increases as well.
Only one observation lies considerably far below the diagonal:
Sweden in panel c, which is due to a data issue. Due to a legislative
change, part of Swedish certificates became ineligible for export in
2010 and these certificates are not included in the database. The rest of
the observations that lie below the diagonal (4 out of 52) are countries
with very low certification rates (< 2.5%).
5.2. Churn rate
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the three different churn
rates for individual countries (corresponding to Eqs. 2–4).4 The three
churn rates all have very low averages but are somewhat different from
each other. The mean of the churn rate based on cancellations (0.46) is
more than double the mean of the churn rate based on current year's
issuance (0.21). The churn rates based on previous year's issuance and
cancellations are more similar, both in terms of the means and standard
deviations. This also holds for most individual years (not reported
here). This suggests that cancellations tend to follow previous year's
issuance closer than current year's issuance.
The churn rate remains low in each country. Fig. 3 compares the
simple average of the three churn rates between four time periods:
2001–2004 with 2005–2008 (panel a), 2005–2008 with 2009–2012
(panel b) and 2009–2012 with 2013–2016 (panel c). To facilitate
readability, observations in the origin, reflecting zero domestic trade in
both periods, are omitted. In the period 2009–2012, Austria is the first
country where the churn rate exceeds 1 (1.4). The highest churn rates
are observed in Estonia (2.2) and Italy (2.5), both in the most recent
period. Other countries do not experience churn rates above 1.5 in any
of the periods.
Fig. 3 reveals mixed growth experiences over time between coun-
tries. Several countries have experienced steady increases in the churn
rates since the beginning, such as Norway and Denmark. A few coun-
tries have experienced decreases, particularly in the period 2009–2012,
such as Italy and France. In the most recent period, the churn rate has
been increasing in almost all countries. Nevertheless, the levels remain
very far below 10 in each country.
For all countries combined, the churn rate displays an increasing
trend over time (Fig. 4). From 2002–2016, the churn rate and country-
Table 2
Summary statistics of three churn rates for individual countries.
Source: own calculations, AIB.
x^1 x^2 x^3
Mean 0.21 0.36 0.46
Standard deviation 0.50 0.85 0.85
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 5.69 7.22 6.71
Note: The first churn rate approximates final consumption by the number of
issued certificates (x^1), the second by the number of issued certificates in the
previous year (x^2) and the third by the number of cancelled certificates (x^3).
Fig. 3. Churn rate per country, 2001–2016. Note: Each plot compares the 4-
year average with the preceding 4-year average from 2001 to 2016. Countries
in (0,0) have active certification schemes. Differences in scaling are chosen to
enable identification of individual countries in graphs.
Source: own calculations, AIB.
4 After calculating the churn rates, 6 curious observations in 5 countries were
deleted (Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Iceland). See Appendix B
for clarification.
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weighted average churn rate increased on average 14.5% and 16.7%
per year, respectively. However, the levels of 1.65 (whole area) and
0.56 (country-weighted average) in 2016 are very poor and far from
levels generally considered as liquid.
5.3. Price volatility
Fig. 5 shows the development of spot prices for products for which
we have most observations: Nordic hydro, Italian hydro and EU (i.e.
unspecified) hydro (panel a) and EU biomass, EU solar and EU wind
(panel b). At first glance, there appears some co-movement but, at
times, peaks in some prices are hardly reflected in the other prices.
Correlation coefficients of the spot prices (see Table C.1 in Appendix C)
suggest that, to some extent, certificates from different countries and
technologies have their own price dynamics. Some products are
strongly correlated but other products are uncorrelated or even nega-
tively correlated. This confirms that a product division on the basis of
region and technology is appropriate.
The volatility in certificate prices is relatively high. Table 3 reports
the volatility in monthly spot prices. Volatility differs by product but is
quite high for all products. In 2017, volatility ranged from 3.4% for
Dutch wind certificates (effectively based on only two price-change
observations) to 105.6% for Belgian wind certificates. The volatility in
Nordic hydro certificates, one of the most liquid products, was 14.3%.
Over time, volatility has been fluctuating but the patterns do not appear
to suggest a stable improvement.
Fig. 4. Churn rate in all countries combined, 2 types, 2001–2016.
Source: own calculations, AIB.
Fig. 5. Spot prices for hydro GO certificates in three countries (panel a) and for GO certificates in the EU (i.e. not specified by country) for three different technologies
(panel b), 2011–2017, per month.
Source: Greenfact.
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5.4. Expiration rate
Fig. 6 depicts the expiration rate per year from 2001 to 2016 in the
whole region. The amount of expired certificates ranged between 5%
and 25% from 2001 to 2003. From 2004–2016, the expiration rate
appears more stable, being on average 6.5% and ranging from 2.4% to
10.4%. This indicates that, while most certificates are cancelled, a
substantial amount of certificates expires and therefore remains unused
for proving the consumption of renewable electricity.
Fig. 7 compares the expiration rate in individual countries between
four periods: 2001–2004 with 2005–2008 (panel a), 2005–2008 with
2009–2012 (panel b) and 2009–2012 with 2013–2016 (panel c). We
exclude the expiration rate in Luxembourg in 2011, 2012 and 2014
because they exceed 100%, which should be impossible. We suspect
this is caused by inaccuracies in the database. Interestingly, the number
of countries without expirations decreases from 9 in the first period
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and
Switzerland) to 2 in the last period (Austria and Portugal). Denmark
and Norway have very high expiration rates (> 38%) in the initial
years, but these decrease to less than 5% in the most recent period.
From 2009–2012, the expiration rate decreases to levels below 8% in all
countries except for Denmark. However, in the most recent period,
expirations increase again in the majority of countries. Interestingly,
the expiration rate appears high in major importing countries such as
Germany and the Netherlands.
5.5. Certificate design features and market performance
Our panel, consisting of 20 countries with data from 2001 to 2015,
is unbalanced due to the fact that some countries start operating a
certification scheme after 2001. There are also several years missing for
the electricity price in Croatia, Estonia and Iceland.
We apply a within estimation procedure to estimate the coefficients
of Eqs. (8) and (9) because the time-invariant individual effects may be
correlated with some of our regressors. For example, one could well
imagine that differences in preferences for renewable electricity be-
tween countries are correlated with income (Mozumder et al., 2011) or
renewable electricity generation. As a consequence, we do not obtain
estimates for the certification and export restriction variables as these
did not vary over time in practice.
Statistical tests suggest that the assumption of white-noise errors is
not satisfied. Autocorrelation tests, as proposed by Wooldridge (2002),
do not suggest that autocorrelation is present. However, likelihood-
ratio tests suggest that the errors are heteroskedastic. Therefore, we
compute White standard errors. We opt for this solution rather than
computing cluster-robust standard errors because our sample consists of
20 clusters, much lower than the threshold for reliable inference on the
basis of cluster-robust standard errors of 50 according to Cameron et al.
(2008).
Table 4 reports our estimation results where Model A reports the
results of the model in Eq. (8) (columns 2,3 and 4) and Model B reports
the results of the extended model in Eq. (9) (columns 5, 6 and 7). Note
that model B has a considerably higher explanatory power (within R-
squared of 0.710 vs. 0.223 in model A) while the signs, sizes and sig-
nificance levels of our estimates are largely consistent between the two
models.
The estimates imply that the presence of the international standard
positively influences the market volume. The estimated coefficients are
14.07 and 8.95 respectively for model A and B which both are sig-
nificant at a 0.01 confidence level. This effect is substantial: on average,
the presence of the international standard positively affects the volume
of issued certificates by 9–14 TWh. The increase in volume is approxi-
mately equal to 57–90% of the median volume of issued certificates in
2016.
The estimated effect of having a private instead of a public certifier
is negative in both specifications and marginally significant (p-values of
0.07 and 0.12 in models A and B respectively). The estimated coeffi-
cients of −5.88 and −4.51 are considerable in size in both models.
Although these estimates are less statistically significant, this may point
to a negative effect of private certifiers on market volumes. A possible
explanation for this negative effect may be that, despite regulatory
Table 3
Volatility in monthly spot prices (annual averages), 2011–2017.
Country Technology 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017




EU (unspeci- Biomass 22.2% 54.4% 8.9% 41.7% 33.3%
fied) Hydro 33.6% 40.7% 34.4%
Solar 23.1% 10.4% 78.1%
Wind 16.0% 69.0% 32.6% 198.0% 54.7% 30.0% 34.3%




Note: Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly relative price changes.
Fig. 6. Expiration rate, all countries combined, 2001–2016.
Source: own calculations, AIB.
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measures in some countries, private certifiers are able to exert market
power, resulting in higher certification fees and lower market volumes.
Supportive to this explanation, it appears from AIB (2015) statistics that
three out of the four highest variable certification fees in 2015 were
charged by private certifiers. Another reason could be that end-users
regard signals from private certifiers as less trustworthy, as noted by
Mahenc (2017).
As expected, the generation of renewable electricity has a strongly
significant positive effect on the market volume. The estimated coeffi-
cient for the GDP index is positive, conform expectation, and margin-
ally significant. Our estimates for the coefficient of the electricity price
have contrasting signs in the two models but are highly insignificant.
Fig. 7. Expiration rate per country, 2001–2016. Note: Each plot compares the 4-year average with the preceding 4-year average from 2001 to 2016. Countries in (0,0)
have active certification schemes. Differences in scaling are chosen to enable identification of individual countries in graphs.
Source: own calculations, AIB.
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6. Conclusions and policy implications
Certification schemes have been introduced in renewable energy
markets to address the problem of information asymmetry. Information
asymmetry is an inherent market failure in energy markets because
consumers cannot credibly distinguish between renewable and non-
renewable energy. While certification is currently predominantly pre-
sent in electricity markets, certification is expected to play an increas-
ingly important role in other energy markets once renewable produc-
tion comes off the ground in those markets (e.g. natural gas, hydrogen).
Therefore, it is important to verify whether certification schemes prove
an effective mechanism to facilitate trade in renewable energy and
investigate how these schemes can be designed effectively.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance of cer-
tificate markets and analyse the relationship between certificate system
design and market performance. We apply our analysis to the market
for electricity GO certification in twenty European countries. We eval-
uate market performance by analysing (1) the share of certified re-
newable electricity, (2) the churn rate, (3) price volatility and (4) the
share of expired certificates (a measure for ‘excess’ supply). We use
panel data to assess the effect on market performance of two critical
design features of certificate systems: the public/private nature of
certifiers and the presence of a common international standard.
Overall, our results suggest that markets for GOs remain in their
infancies. The share of renewable electricity that receives certification
has increased in the EU as a whole and in most individual countries
since 2001. However, the other performance indicators yield a more
pessimistic view. Market liquidity as measured by the churn rate is very
poor and far below levels which are generally associated with a mature
and liquid market, both in the region as a whole and in all individual
countries. With respect to price volatility, GO certificate prices are very
volatile and there are no clear signs of improvement over time. In ad-
dition to poor liquidity and high price volatility, the market appears to
have been in a constant state of oversupply as a considerable amount of
issued certificates is never used to claim the consumption of renewable
electricity.
Our analysis indicates that certification-scheme design choices af-
fect market outcomes. We find that adopting a common international
standard has a strong positive affect on market volumes. Moreover, we
find some evidence that private certifiers are associated with lower
market volumes, which may be due to the higher certification fees that
they appear to charge.
A number of data-related caveats of our analysis should be men-
tioned. First of all, our certification database is incomplete as ob-
servations for two countries were partly missing. Second, a few errors
were discovered in the certification data. Although serious, we believe
that we were able to handle these errors and obtained meaningful re-
sults. Thirdly, due to a lack of transparency in market prices, we rely on
GO prices from a market monitoring firm. In case these prices are not
representative for the market, some of our results may not be re-
presentative for the market. Therefore, we recommend to improve the
availability of data for certificate markets as this would facilitate both
market liquidity and the research on renewable energy markets.
Several policy implications can be drawn from this analysis. We
found that European certificate markets are not yet functioning effi-
ciently. With respect to certificate system design, international stan-
dardization of certificates contributes to the efficiency of certificate
markets. Public ownership over the certifier may also have a positive
effect although further research is required to corroborate this finding.
In addition, policies that aim to improve market transparency may
benefit the performance of certificate markets. The current lack of
transparency, particularly regarding prices, may harm the confidence of
market participants with respect to price formation and deter market
entry.
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Fixed effects panel data estimation, 2001–2015. Dependent variable: Volume of issued certificates (TWh).
Model A Model B
Coefficient Standard error p-value Coefficient Standard error p-value
International standard 14.07*** 2.955 0.000 8.95*** 2.955 0.003
Private certifier − 5.88* 3.181 0.066 − 4.51 2.888 0.120
Renewable electricity generation (TWh) 0.167** 0.0801 0.039 0.233*** 0.094 0.013
GDP index 0.249* 0.148 0.093 0.139 0.084 0.102
Electricity price (€/kWh) − 38.48 37.94 0.311 5.417 31.55 0.864
Constant − 33.86*** 12.55 0.007 − 28.71*** 8.59 0.001
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Period-country fixed effectsa No Yes
Observations 284 284
Within R-squared 0.223 0.710
Number of countries 20 20
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 010.
a Period-country fixed effects refer to dummy variables for each country i that are equal to one for country i during the period 2009–2015 and zero otherwise.
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics
(See Tables A1 and A2)
Table A1
Descriptive statistics for all variables except for GO certificate prices (all yearly averages), 2001–2016.
Sources: Certification: AIB; Renewable electricity production, electricity price (both except for Switzerland) and GDP index: Eurostat; Swiss renewable electricity
production: IEA; Swiss electricity price: Swiss Federal Office of Energy.
2001–2004 2005–2008 2009–2012 2013–2016
Certification
Issued volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 8.26 111.08 135.70 136.11
mean 0.81 5.57 10.83 18.82
SD 1.88 16.58 25.94 30.43
Cancelled volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 7.55 28.75 43.81 87.59
mean 0.38 3.06 9.86 15.85
SD 1.23 6.34 13.22 19.70
Domestically transferred volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 0.54 39.58 43.76 88.99
mean 0.03 1.00 4.67 11.98
SD 0.10 4.71 9.18 20.57
Expired volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 0.54 39.58 43.76 88.99
mean 0.03 1.00 4.67 11.98
SD 0.10 4.71 9.18 20.57
Imported volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 8.35 28.14 52.89 80.31
mean 0.21 2.15 8.22 14.31
SD 1.23 4.97 13.12 20.50
Exported volume (TWh)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 6.43 50.54 134.49 161.82
mean 0.20 2.03 8.10 14.19
SD 0.94 7.08 21.83 29.29
Renewable electricity production (TWh)
min 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.32
max 131.39 142.97 159.98 203.70
mean 31.05 35.21 42.21 50.75
SD 34.20 38.61 44.16 54.07
Electricity price (€/kWh)
min 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11
max 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.31
mean 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.19
SD 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
GDP index
min 75.30 88.30 94.20 90.20
max 100.60 121.20 112.20 149.70
mean 88.02 99.90 100.36 105.71
SD 5.84 5.68 2.72 9.60
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Appendix B. Construction of churn rates and data issues
In the Czech Republic, Finland and Italy, the churn rates based on cancellations spike to unrealistically high levels in the very first year of
operation (e.g. 30 in Finland). These rates all drop after the first year and both churn rates based on issuance do not spike. The majority of these
certificates was most probably cancelled (or expired) in the next year, thereby inflating the churn rate based on cancellations in the first year of
operation. For these three countries, we can be quite certain that the spikes are caused by the way we constructed the churn rates.
Table A2
Descriptive statistics of GO certificate spot prices (all yearly averages; Eurocent/MWh), 2011–2017.
Source: Greenfact.

















min 26.07 10.85 10.93 4.88 5.81 9.85 12.07
max 26.66 27.01 10.93 11.50 9.05 24.50 28.00
mean 26.36 20.06 10.93 7.43 7.62 18.15 20.50
SD 0.42 7.41 2.92 1.18 4.44 5.21
Hydro
min 4.62 10.50 14.00
max 24.00 31.25 41.84
mean 9.80 20.28 24.97
SD 5.13 6.43 7.43
Solar
min 15.00 22.38 15.15
max 21.86 54.15 46.71
mean 19.08 43.92 25.84
SD 2.57 12.61 9.86
Wind
min 25.75 11.00 9.00 4.50 5.86 18.50 15.51
max 66.93 48.00 30.55 38.93 18.87 37.05 44.00
mean 40.94 34.05 19.36 19.71 14.17 24.58 27.36
SD 16.61 14.01 9.19 13.54 4.53 5.79 8.37
Italy Hydro
min 7.25 15.77 14.00
max 18.00 29.00 41.67
mean 10.57 21.26 26.06

















min 18.83 12.33 8.60 4.56 4.97 14.66 19.40
max 62.02 40.08 22.65 10.59 11.73 33.15 39.77
mean 42.45 27.47 15.10 6.57 8.06 21.75 25.88
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For Germany, both the churn rate based on issuance and previous year's issuance spike in 2002 to more than 1000 and 3000 respectively. These
spikes are caused by an extremely high level of domestic transfers (more than 513,000) in 2002. In 2001 and 2002 combined, there were less than
600 certificates issued and no imports at all. Moreover, no transfers at all were conducted in Germany in any other year between 2001 until 2007.
Also, no cancellations occurred until 2004. This gives sufficient reason to believe that the number of 513,000 transfers does not represent the actual
traded volume in Germany in 2002.
In Iceland, the churn rate based on cancellations spikes to 243 in 2015 (coming from 0.37 in the previous year). This is caused by a concurrent
decrease in cancelled volume of 89% and massive increase in transferred volume of 7410%. We cannot conclude that our calculation method causes
the spike nor that it is caused by suspicious reporting. Two signals that the spike does not represent the actual state of liquidity in 2015 are: (i) the
other two churn rates in that year take on plausible values and (ii) the churn rate based on cancellations drops again to 1.8 in 2016. Moreover, even
in the most mature and liquid markets, churn rates of 243 are rarely observed. Therefore, we omit this observation.
Appendix C. Correlation coefficients between certificate spot price series
(See Table C1)
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Table C1
Correlation coefficients between certificate spot price series, 2011–2017.
Nordic Hydro EU Biomass EU Hydro EU Solar EU Wind IT Hydro
Nordic Hydro
EU Biomass 0.84
EU Hydro 0.12 − 0.03
EU Solar 0.86 0.92 0.04
EU Wind 0.57 0.58 − 0.14 0.57
IT Hydro 0.63 0.84 0.01 0.78 0.44
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